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• Terra satellite is the flagship of NASA’s Earth Observing System 
(EOS)
• Evolution of Terra Operations, including challenges and 
successes
• Steps taken to preserve science requirements and prolong 
spacecraft life
– 5 year design lifetime with a goal of 6 years
– Successful operations approaching 15 years (Doing something right)
• Review Terra Spacecraft mission successes and unique 
spacecraft components that allowed for extended mission life 
and science
– Special Activities
– Anomaly Recovery Efforts
• Future Plans for continued Operations
Abstract
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Mission Overview
Terra Features
• Launch Date:  December 18,1999  (Atlas IIAS, VAFB)
• Orbit:  705 km, sun-synchronous polar, 98.2o Inclination, 10:30 AM 
MLT descending node
• Instrument Payload:
– ASTER (SWIR, TIR & VNIR) - Advanced Spaceborne Thermal 
Emission and Reflection Radiometer (Japan)
– CERES (Fore & Aft) - Clouds and the Earth's Radiant Energy 
System (USA – Langley)
– MISR - Multi-angle Imaging Spectro-Radiometer (USA – JPL)
– MODIS - Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectro-radiometer (USA –
GSFC)
– MOPITT - Measurement of Pollution in the Troposphere  (Canada)
• Project Management:  Earth Science Mission Operations (ESMO)
• Spacecraft Flight Operations:  Contracted by GSFC to Honeywell/ 
ASRC/GATS/AIMM team and supported by NASA NENs and TDRSS
• Instrument Operations and Science Data processing:  Performed at 
respective Instrument Locations where developed
• Mission Duration: Successfully completed Prime mission of 5 years.  
Currently in Extended Operation.
• Distributed Active Archive Centers: LP DAAC – MODIS, ASTER;  
Langley DAAC – CERES, MISR, MOPITT
Science
• The primary objective of the Terra Mission is to simultaneously study 
clouds, water vapor, aerosol, trace gases, land surface and oceanic 
properties, as well as the interaction between them and their effect on 
the Earth’s energy budget and climate.
4
Terra Video
• Terra’s Subsystems continue to perform well on primary hardware
• Propellant remains the life limiting item
– Maintaining orbit has required 122 propulsive maneuvers since insertion into 
mission orbit.  The types of maneuvers include:
o Drag Make-up (DMU) maneuvers to compensate for effects of atmospheric drag
o Inclination Adjust Maneuvers (IAMs) to maintain the proper sun-synchronous 
precession rate
– Terra has sufficient propellant to continue nominal operations at the 705 km 
orbit height through January 2020 and reserve sufficient fuel to meet 705km 
Constellation Exit Requirements (2km below Constellation orbit)
• Battery Capacity is closely monitored – significant power margin exists
• Battery Temperature is closely monitored
– Hex Bay Battery lost Heater Control (4/9) of the battery due to 
Micrometeoroid or Orbital Debris (MMOD)
– Power Module Battery continues to operate nominally
• Solar Array Performance – Significant Power Margin even with 1/24th of 
capability lost in 2000
Spacecraft Subsystem Performance
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Terra has sufficient propellant to continue nominal operations at the 705 km orbit 
height through January 2020 and reserve sufficient fuel to meet 705km Constellation 
Exit Requirements (2km below Constellation orbit)
Spacecraft Subsystem Performance
Fuel Usage
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SA Power Prediction
• Avg. Total Power Required is the power needed to support SC loads and battery charging
• Assuming the current rate of SA power degradation, and assuming the same load required, Terra’s SA 
should be able to support the power requirements through 2022+ 
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• MODIS Direct Broadcast – Build it and they will come
– Terra’s MODIS DB data has proven to be extremely popular and beneficial for 
operational use throughout the world for weather forecasting, fire 
management and monitoring, disaster management and monitoring, fishery, 
military application, etc.
– Over 200 identified ground stations that receive and process Terra DB data
– Processed data are distributed further to various government and private 
institutions and users
• Solar Array Blanket
– Lightweight design: ~1/3 mass compared with traditional solar arrays of 
similar size
– Reduction in weight allowed for better alignment of translation thrusters 
through center of spacecraft mass minimizing the complexity of yawing the 
spacecraft to perform nominal drag make up maneuvers
Spacecraft-Unique Subsystem 
Component Design
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• Regulated 120V Bus controlled by Power Distribution Unit (PDU)
– First orbiting 120V regulated bus by NASA 
– Reason for selecting 120V Bus:  
o Handle the high power demands for the spacecraft bus and instruments
o Reduce the spacecraft mass
o Reduce parasitic losses
o Reduce bus noise 
– PDU regulates the spacecraft bus power by providing control signals to the Solar 
Array (SA) Sequential Shunt Unit (SSU) and the Battery Power Conditioner (BPC)
• Battery Cell Bypass Protection added after initial design to all 108 cells
– prevents a cell failing “open” to cause loss of all 54 cells within a battery
– Some experts considered this an unlikely scenario  
o Cell failure during MMOD event resulted in open cell.  
o Bypass protection allowed operations to continue without interrupting science
• Battery Power Conditioner (BPC)
– Performs both Charge and Discharge Functions to/from the batteries
Spacecraft-Unique Subsystem 
Component Design
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Power subsystem was designed to operate batteries independently yet have the 
batteries share the spacecraft load.
Spacecraft-Unique Subsystem 
Component Design
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The following charts show examples of 
challenges and anomalies encountered by the 
mission operations team at GSFC and how they 
have been resolved/accommodated while 
keeping Terra operations nominal.
Terra Challenges and Anomalies
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• Prior to adding processes to monitor for conjunctions with orbital debris and active 
satellites, the FOT was focused on maintaining spacecraft Health & Safety, maintaining 
orbit, performing calibration activities, and ensuring the downlink of science data
• Conjunction Assessment became a new high priority to protect Terra and other 
satellites, and to preserve popular orbits from additional debris
– The conjunction assessment process not only evaluates the conjunction of two objects, it 
also evaluates post-maneuver conjunctions to provide insight on how safe a planned 
maneuver is before execution
– Terra was the first of the 705km International Constellation satellites to perform a Risk 
Mitigation Maneuver (RMM) on October 21, 2005 
• This evolving threat was exacerbated by the Chinese anti-satellite missile test with 
Fengyun 1C on January 11, 2007 and the Iridium 33/COSMOS 2251 collision on 
February 10, 2009
• As of July 19, 2014, Terra has conducted 12 Risk Mitigation Maneuvers (RMMs) 
– include either performing a maneuver to mitigate a conjunction or waiving off a maneuver to 
prevent a post maneuver conjunction
• Another 12 predicted conjunctions required RMM planning but eventually conjunction 
risk reduced prior to maneuver execution allowing for the RMM to be waived off
Terra Challenges
Conjunction Assessment
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• Micro Meteor Orbital Debris (MMOD) is believed to be the most likely 
cause of the BBAT cell failure (1 of 54) and loss of heater control for half of 
BBAT.  PBAT remains unaffected 
• To compensate for the BBAT lost heater control: 
– BBAT has been configured to perform slight overcharge to maintain cell 
temperatures above freezing.
– Recently, the FOT has utilized the BPC to shift additional load to the BBAT and 
less load to PBAT.  
o This increased BBAT discharge every orbit increased the temperature of the BBAT 
cold cells by approximately 2 degrees Celsius thereby reducing the risk of BBAT 
cells reaching freezing temperatures if a spacecraft load reduction were to occur
o The FOT accomplished this by utilizing the BPC design in a way that was not 
envisioned during development.  After consultation with the spacecraft 
manufacturer, GSFC battery experts and Flight Software Sustaining Engineering, 
changes were made to the battery management software to allow for the batteries 
to be operated independently.  Disabling the PBAT BPC Channel increased the 
BBAT discharge by 14%
Terra Challenges
Battery Anomaly and MMOD Strikes
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Although not intended to operate the batteries in an unbalanced mode, the 
design allowed for disabling one BPC1 Channel which reduced discharge on 
PBAT to 3/7 and increased BBAT to 4/7.  The additional load resulted in a 2 
degree increase in BBAT cold cell temperatures.
BPC1 Channel Disable to Increase 
BBAT Temperatures
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BPC1 CH Disable Summary
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BBAT
- Approx. 2°C increase on coldest cells
- Approx. 1°C increase on BBAT avg temp
- Decrease in heater Duty Cycle
- Delta decrease from ~10°C to ~8.5°C
PBAT
- Approx. 0.3°C decrease on PBAT avg temp
- Still within heater setpoints
- Increase in Heater duty cycle
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• The design of the Communication fill blocks did not include 
bit synch
• This requires Terra, on each and every support, to play back 
live science data in order for White Sands (WS) to lock on the 
data (actual science data blocks contain bit synch) 
• However, because this doesn’t happen immediately, this 
initial data must be replayed again once all the data is down, 
to capture the portion of the data that was missed while WS 
was locking onto the data stream
• This has increased the complexity of capturing the data, and 
thus leading to operator errors/data losses and complicating 
automation of SSR operations
Terra Challenges
Lack of Bit Synch in Fill Blocks
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• The Motor Drive Assembly (MDA) Built-In Test Equipment (BITE) is designed to 
protect the MDA.  If the  motor current is too high (above 1250 mA) or too low 
(less than 475 mA), the Antenna Control (ACON) automatically turns off the MDA in 
response and sets a bit to indicate an MDABITE failure
• However, the High Gain Antenna (HGA) Motor Drive Assembly (MDA) Opto-
couplers are susceptible to single event upsets, induced by high energy protons 
usually over the South Atlantic Anomaly or the poles, which causes the protection 
to trip erroneously
• When the MDA is turned off, the HGA loses proper pointing control and will begin 
off-pointing from the intended TDRS satellite. This can result in a drop out of the K-
Band (High Rate Science) and S-Band (Command/Telemetry) communications links 
through the HGA until the MDA can be recovered
• This anomaly continues to reoccur, with 2153 recorded MDA2 BITE Failures 
between 12/19/99 - 6/25/2014 (approximately 12-14 times a month) 
• Due to this issue a Telemetry Monitor (TMON) was developed to allow the flight 
software on board to recycle the MDA by detecting when a MDA2BITE failure 
occurs and will reset the MDA, recovering within a minute of the first occurrence, 
minimizing the impact to K-Band and S-Band
Terra Challenges
HGA MDA2BITE Anomaly
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• EMOS sustained a significant IT security intrusion in Spring 
2006 that had the potential to disrupt commanding to the 3 
EOS missions
• Many security enhancements have been implemented since 
the intrusion which greatly improve the EOS ground system 
security posture and system reliability
• ESMO has implemented re-hosting and re-engineering the 
ground system with new hardware, software, and operating 
systems
• The improvements are designed to be vendor-maintained 
through 2015 and beyond, reduce security vulnerabilities, and 
maintain a backup control center capable of performing 
nominal operations
Terra Challenges
IT Security Threats
19
• Maintaining aging hardware and deploying required security 
updates to the current ground system is challenging because 
of the lack of vendor support for the old hardware and 
operating systems
• Testing and transitioning to the new systems with minimal 
impact to operations required extensive coordination and re-
planning around spacecraft anomalies and critical activities
• The EOS missions accomplished this over the course of 
several years while maintaining full operations of all three 
missions
• Analogy: Trying to fix a car while it is moving down the 
highway with everything still performing normally
Terra Challenges
Ground System Obsolescence
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Terra Future Plans
Baseline Constellation Exit Plan
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Mission Requirement
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Partial Level 1
Compliance
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Oct 2017
MLT < 10:15
& Constellation Exit
January 2020
MLT < 10:29
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January 2022
Not in Level 1 
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this point
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Terra Future Plans
Proposed Constellation Exit Plan
22
10:15
10:29
10:45
10:31
Final IAM
Oct 2020
Mission Requirement
Operational Range MLT < 10:29
April 2021
MLT < 10:15
& Constellation Exit
November 2022
Last inclination 
series in Feb 
2017  
< 10:29 in 
Mar 2018  
Constellation 
Exit in Jan 
2020  
Purple indicates 
Baseline timeline
*After Nov 2022 not Level 1 compliant
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Summary
• Terra continues to perform nominally and provide excellent data for the 
science community and operational users
– Still operating on primary spacecraft components except for the Direct Access 
System (DB) Module (operating on redundant side)
– All the instruments are producing science data except ASTER-SWIR
– Anomalies have been successfully resolved/accommodated
• Data Capture/L0 Processing Status – GREEN
• Solid State Recorder Data Capture to 06/30/2014:  99.30%
• Data Latency – Excellent (Near realtime data delivered within 2.5 hours)
• Ground Systems – Major System Upgrades completed
• Responding to new security requirements and upgrades to obsolete hardware 
or COTS systems, as required
• Future Terra Operations
– Proposed options for Post-2017 science operations have been 
developed—needs review by Science Team, Constellation members, and 
NASA Headquarters
Backup Charts
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Subsystem Component Design Current Capability Comments
EPS
Solar Array
24 
Shunts
23 
Shunts
96%
Degradation is minimal.  Fully capable of supporting 
mission through 2022 unless future failures occur
Batteries
108 
Cells
107 
Cells
99%
Hex Bay Battery cell #50 failed on 10/15/09, Significant 
Power Margin. Not an issue.
Batteries
36 Heater 
Controls
28 Heater 
Controls
77%
BBAT heater control failed on 4 of 9 heater groups on 
primary, redundant, and survival.  Battery cell 
charging/discharging and the remaining heater groups 
are preventing cells from freezing.   Power Module 
Battery heater control performance is nominal
COMM X-Band 2 1 75%
Direct Access System Modulator Side 1 failed (50%).  
Solid State Power Amplifier redundancy still available 
(100%).  X-Band no required to meet mission 
requirements
CDH SSR 59 PWA 50 PWA 84.70%
Recycle of Data Memory Unit likely to recover all 
Printed Wire Assemblies (PWA)
Instruments          
ASTER -
SWIR
2 2 Failed
Cooler is unable to maintain detector temperature.  
Science Data is unusable (Fully Saturated) and is no 
longer being recorded.  Still collecting and monitoring 
Engineering data.
MODIS 2 1 50%
Power Supply #2 failed, Formatter A degraded, cross-
strapped.  Science is nominal.
MOPITT 2 1 50%
Displacer B and Chopper Motor failed.  Only 47% of 
science is valid.
Degraded Components
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All other Spacecraft components have full redundancy.  
Subsystem Component Design Current Capability Comments
EPS
Solar Array 24 Shunts 23 Shunts 96%
Degradation is minimal.  Fully capable of supporting mission through 2020 unless future failures 
occur.
Batteries 108 Cells 107 Cells 99% BBAT cell #50 failed on 10/15/09.
Batteries
36 Heater 
Controls
28 Heater 
Controls
77%
BBAT heater control failed on 4 of 9 heater groups on primary, redundant, and survival.  Battery 
cell charging/discharging and the remaining heater groups are preventing cells from freezing.   
PBAT heater control performance is nominal.  
TCS
MOPITTCPHTS 2 2 Full Performance is nominal
SWIR CPHTS 2 2 Full
Performance is nominal
TIR CPHTS 2 2 Full Random temperature fluctuations.  Performance within requirements.
SCC SCC 2 2 Full Performance is nominal
COMM
HGA 2 2 Full MDA BITE failures occur 2-3/week due to SEU.  Recoverable
X-Band 2 1 75% DAS Modulator 1 failed (50%).  Solid State Power Amplifier redundancy still available (100%).  
CTIU 2 2 Full Performance is nominal
OMNI 2 2 Full Performance is nominal
CDH
MO 2 2 Full Drift rate changes have occurred since 10/3/10.  Performance is within requirements.
SFE 2 2 Full SFE SEU occur 1-2/year.  Recoverable
SSR 59 PWA 50 PWA 84.7% Recycle of Data Memory Unit likely to recover all Printed Wire Assemblies
GNC
IRU 3 3 Full Performance is nominal.   2 for 3 redundancy
TAM 2 2 Full Performance is nominal
SSST 2 2 Full Observed minor loss of sensitivity in SSSTs, investigating star catalog or tracker param updates
CSS 2 2 Full Performance is nominal
ESA 2 2 Full Performance is nominal
FSS 1 1 Full Performance is nominal.  Not currently used
RWA 4 4 Full Performance is nominal.  3 for 4 redundancy
MTR 3 3 Full Performance is nominal
Prop REAs 16 16 Full Performance is nominal
Instruments          
ASTER - SWIR 2 2 10%
Cooler is unable to maintain detector temperature.  Science Data is unusable (Fully Saturated) 
and is no longer being recorded.  Still collecting and monitoring Engineering data.
ASTER - TIR 2 2 Full Performance is nominal
ASTER - VNIR 2 2 Full Performance is nominal
CERES - Aft 1 1 Full Performance is nominal
CERES - Fore 1 1 Full Performance is nominal
MISR 2 2 Full Performance is nominal
MODIS 2 1 50% Power Supply #2 failed, Formatter A degraded, cross-strapped.  All Science is nominal.
MOPITT 2 1 50% Displacer B and Chopper Motor failed.  Only 47% of science is valid.
Life Limiting Components
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Terra Hardware Anomalies
1 of 3
Date Incident Cause Response 
12/18/1999 Solar Array Blanket Box A-
side Failed to indicate Open 
during deployment. 
Redundant side indicated open.  Cause of 
failure unknown. 
Able to deploy mast anyway.  Blanket Box was separated.  Telemetry 
failed to indicate so.  Component is turned off and never planned to 
be used again. (1)  LRB 1 or harness would require 2 failures 
to produce observed signature
(2) PMEA 1 PWB has single wiring runs to and 
from LRB circuit relay and potential single 
point failure at plated through hole for relay pin 
9/24/2000 Solar Array Shunt 10 failed Cause Unknown.  Unsuccessful in identifying 
a single cause of the anomaly and digging 
further will require addressing multiple 
failures. 
Nominal operations was able to continue.  Reviewed impact to 
propulsive maneuvers and continue to watch. 
5/7/2001 MOPITT Displacer B failed Cause Unknown. The compression wave created by the coolers moves the free floating 
displacer.   This side of the compressor needs to continue operating 
for counterbalance.  Operating at a reduced compression to provide 
some counterbalance but to prevent the free floating displacer from 
hitting it's stop causing so-called "Ringing Effect".  The failed side 
6/15/2001 MODIS Power Supply 2 failed Power Supply Shutdown caused by a thermal 
runaway condition in one of the two Down 
Regulator FETs.  Suspect a High Energy 
Particle was the cause of the thermal runaway 
condition damaging the FET 
Switched to Power Supply 1. 
8/4/2001 MOPITT Chopper Motor 3 
failed 
The anomaly likely caused a fuse to blow 
resulting in a permanent failed chopper motor.  
Transistor Drive Circuit is likely cause.   
This corrupts the science data on channels 5 & 6.  Note:  Channels 5-
8 are the only channels which provided good science data since the 
Displacer B Anomaly.  Fortunately, Chopper 3 stopped at an open or 
partially open position allowing data to be captured minimizing the 
9/10/02 MODIS Science data was effected.  MODIS Formatter Swap to 
Side B was performed on 9/17/02.  Since the switch, no Formatter 
Errors have been detected and the data quality is excellent.
   
Evaluated EPC operational range.  Determined nominal operations 
can exist at reduced load.
9/10/2002 MODIS Formatter A Timing 
Errors corrupting Science  
(Degraded Performance) 
Formatter A has had a history of problems 
which resulted in processing errors.   The 
likely cause of the Formatter Timing Errors is 
an incorrectly terminated clock signal.   Fixed 
on Aqua. 
1/4/2000 PMEA Load Resistor Box 
(LRB) Circuit 1B Failed while 
re-enabling LRB circuits after 
successful HW fire test. LRB 
circuit 1B telemetry read 
enabled, but EPC 1 current 
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Terra Hardware Anomalies
2 of 3
Date Incident Cause Response
5/6/2003 MODIS Solar Diffuser Screen 
Door Failed to Open
Areas investigated where: Spring problem,  
Disc skipped over the engagement pin, Screw 
pull-up due to door overdrive, Disc damage 
due to door overdrive, Pin damage due to door 
overdrive and Thermal stress damage which is 
the most likely cause. 
No fix to anomaly has been determined.  Instead, the MODIS Solar 
Diffuser Door was opened on July 2nd, 2003.  The door will remain open 
indefinitely while keeping the Screen door closed.  This allows some 
calibration activities to occur.
12/24/2003 MODIS NADIR Door Micro-
Switch fails to indicate Opened
Faulty Switch Does not impact Science Data Collection.  
11/22/2004 MODIS SRCA Lamp #2 Burnt 
Out
Burnt Out Using Spare: Lamps #1, 3 and 4
See 
Comment
SSR Print Wire Assembly 
(PWA) Over-Current Protection
Suspect Over-current protection falsely tripped 
during day/night transitions.  Recycling the 
SSR Data Module Unit (DMU) is likely to reset 
PWAs and return functionality.
PWA-52, DMU-2 (Supersets 102 & 103) occurred on 7/30/03.
PWA-26, DMU-1 (Supersets 50 & 51) occurred on 9/24/03.
PWA-58, DMU-2 (Supersets 114 & 115) occurred on 9/25/03.
PWA-22, DMU-1 (Supersets 42 & 43) occurred on 10/14/03.
PWA-6, DMU-1  (Supersets 10 & 11) occurred on 7/31/04.                                                        
PWA-28, DMU-1 (Supersets 54 & 55) occurred on 8/26/05.
PWA-30, DMU-1 (Supersets 58 & 59) occurred on 4/19/07. 
Swapped DMUs on 6/7/07; Re-allocated buffers (Increased MODIS & 
MISR; reduced ASTER)
PWA-14, DMU-1 (Supersets 26 & 27) occurred on 1/8/10. 
PWA-15, DMU-1 (Supersets 36 & 37) occurred on 4/2/12.
3/1/2006 MODIS SRCA Lamp #3 
Degraded
Degraded Terra SRCA lamp #3 has degraded significantly.  Lamp #3 not to be used 
again.   Terra SRCA lamp operation will follow Aqua SRCA lamp 
operation -- no 30W lamp configuration.    Does not impact Science Data 
Collection.
9/25/2004 ASTER SWIR Detector 
Temperature Control 
degraded.  Total loss of 
useable SWIR science data 
after 4/08.  Declared 
unuseable on 1/09. 
Degraded performance. Suspect temperature 
gradient within compressor.
ASTER SWIR Compressor unable to maintain ideal detector temperature 
which initially only impacted capturing bright scenes however, more 
recently degraded to point of total loss of useable SWIR science data.  
Multiple attempts were made to restart the compressor with different 
control temperatures and/or stroke amplitude.  Some had limited success, 
however, degradation continued.
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Terra Hardware Anomalies
3 of 3
Date Incident Cause Response
5/29/2008 Direct Access System 
Modulator Side 1 (DASM)-1 
EPC-1 failed.
Continuing to Investigate Attempt to power cycle on 6/4/08 was unsuccessful.  On 6/13/08, 
Switched to DASM-2 cross-strapped with Up-Converter-1 and Solid 
State Power Amplifier-1.  Continue with normal operations.
10/13/2009 Hex Bay Battery Assembly 
(BBAT) heater control failed on 
4 of 9 heater groups.
Continuing to Investigate.  Internal heater 
element or heater connector/wire only remaining 
probable causes.  Suspect impact from Micro-
meteoriod or Orbital Debris (MMOD) 
Attempted to recover by soft recycle, power cycle side A, and switch to 
side B of HCE-5A. Beginning 10/13/09, four of nine heater groups in 
BBAT are unable to provide temperature control.  Battery cell 
charging/discharging and the remaining five heater groups are 
preventing cells from freezing.  Both primary (HCE-5A side A), 
redundant (HCE-5A side B), and survival heaters are affected and all 
indications are that it is nonrecoverable   
10/13/2009 Hex Bay Battery Assembly 
(BBAT) cell #50 failed.
Loss of cell pressure. Suspect impact from Micro-
meteoriod Orbital Debris (MMOD). 
Bypass switch for BBAT cell #50 tripped on 10/15/09.  Cell voltage is 
near zero.
10/3/2009 MOPITT Sieve 3 Heater 
Control Circiut Failure
Cause Unknown. None, this heater was operating as a control heater for a molecular 
sieve that was not being used due a cooler system malfunction years 
ago. The removal of this small amount of heat will cause no thermal 
problems with CPHTS, the main MOPITT thermal control system.
12/2/2010 MOPITT Sieve 1 Heater 
Control Circiut Failure
Cause Unknown. None, this heater was operating as a control heater for a molecular 
sieve that was not being used due a cooler system malfunction years 
ago. The removal of this small amount of heat will cause no thermal 
problems with CPHTS, the main MOPITT thermal control system.
11/10/2005 SAA Isc temperature sensor B 
Failure
Cause Unknown. None, this sensor is used to help understand the degradation rate of the 
solar array. All other telemetry associated to power and Solar Array 
performance indicates only the temperature sensor has been affected.
9/28/2008 SAA Isc temperature sensor A 
Failure
Cause Unknown. None, this sensor is used to help understand the degradation rate of the 
solar array. All other telemetry associated to power and Solar Array 
performance indicates only the temperature sensor has been affected.
1/12/2012 SAA Voc temperature sensor A 
Failure
Cause Unknown. None, this sensor is used to help understand the degradation rate of the 
solar array. All other telemetry associated to power and Solar Array 
performance indicates only the temperature sensor has been affected.
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